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ABSTRACT
An Implantable Cardioverter Defibrillator (ICD) is a medical device
used for the detection of potentially fatal cardiac arrhythmia and
their treatment through thedeliveryof electrical shocks intended to
restore normal heart rhythm. An ICD reprogramming attack seeks
to alter the device’s parameters to induce unnecessary shocks and,
even more egregious, prevent required therapy. In this paper, we
present a formal approach for the synthesis of ICD reprogramming
attacks that are both effective, i.e., lead to fundamental changes in
the required therapy, and stealthy, i.e., involve minimal changes to
the nominal ICD parameters. We focus on the discrimination algo-
rithmunderlyingBostonScientific devices (oneof theprincipal ICD
manufacturers)and formulate thesynthesisproblemasoneofmulti-
objective optimization. Our solution technique is based on an Op-
timization Modulo Theories encoding of the problem and allows
us to derive device parameters that are optimal with respect to the
effectiveness-stealthiness tradeoff (i.e., lie along the corresponding
Pareto front). To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first
to derive systematic ICD reprogramming attacks designed to max-
imize therapy disruption while minimizing detection. To evaluate
our technique, we employ an extensive dataset of synthetic EGMs
(cardiac signals), each generated with a prescribed arrhythmia, al-
lowing us to synthesize attacks tailored to the victim’s cardiac con-
dition. Our approach readily generalizes to unseen signals, repre-
senting the unknown EGM of the victim patient.
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1 INTRODUCTION
An Implantable Cardioverter Defibrillator (ICD) is a medical device
for the detection and treatment of potentially fatal heart conditions
suchasventricular tachycardia (VT)andventricularfibrillation(VF).
ICDs run embedded software that processes intracardiac signals,
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called electrograms (EGMs), to detect arrhythmias and deliver ap-
propriate therapy in the form of electrical shocks. ICD software im-
plements so-called discrimination algorithms which comprise mul-
tiple discrimination criteria (discriminators) for the detection and
classification of arrhythmia episodes based on the analysis of EGM
features such as ventricular intervals and signal morphology.
ICD discriminators feature a number of programmable param-
eters that, if adequately configured, ensure minimal rates of mis-
classification and inappropriate/missed therapy [19]. In contrast,
wrongly configured parameters can result in unnecessary shocks,
which are painful and damage the cardiac tissue, and even worse
can prevent required therapy, leading to sudden cardiac death.
An ICD reprogramming attack is one that alters the device’s pa-
rameters to inducemis-classification and inappropriate therapy.Re-
programming attacks can significantly compromise patient safety,
withhigh-profilepatientsbeingobvious targets (e.g. formerUSVice
President Cheney had his pacemaker’s wireless access disabled to
prevent assassination attempts [22]). Seminal work by Halperin et
al. [10] demonstrated that ICDs can be accessed and reprogrammed
by unauthorized users using off-the-shelf software radios. More re-
cently, over half a million cardiac devices have been recalled by
the FDA for security risks related to wireless communication [9],
and researchers managed to gain control of a pacemaker/ICD by
exploiting vulnerabilities in the device’s remote monitoring infras-
tructure [24]. These incidents confirm that vulnerabilities in im-
plantablecardiacdevicesexist, anda thoroughinvestigationofcyber-
attacks on ICDs is needed to improve device safety and security.
In this paper, we present a formal approach for the automated
synthesis of ICD reprogramming attacks that are both effective, i.e.,
lead to fundamental changes in the required therapy, and stealthy,
i.e., involveminimal changes to thenominal ICDparameters.Stealthy
attacks are therefore difficult to detect and even if detected, would
most likely be attributed to a clinician’s error in configuring the de-
vice.
We follow a model-based approach, as the attacks are not evalu-
atedon theactual hardwarebut onamodel of the ICDalgorithm.We
focus on theRhythm ID algorithm implemented inBostonScientific
ICDs (oneof theprincipal ICDmanufacturers),whichwas compiled
from devicemanuals and themedical literature [5, 29]. The discrim-
inators used and computations performed by Rhythm ID are also
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Figure 1: Overview of our method for synthesis of stealthy
reprogramming attacks on ICDs.
found in the algorithms of the three other major ICD manufactur-
ers. Thus, focusing on Rhythm ID does not limit the applicability of
our approach.
Our method, illustrated in Figure 1, synthesizes device parame-
ters that are optimal with respect to the effectiveness-stealthiness
tradeoff (i.e., lie along the corresponding Pareto front). We formu-
late this synthesis problem as one of multi-objective optimization,
andsolve itusingoptimizationmodulo theories (OMT)techniques [4],
an extension of SMT for finding models that optimize given objec-
tives. OMT is uniquely suited to solve this problem, because the
problem is combinatorial in nature (parameters can be configured
from a finite set of values), and is also constrained by the behav-
ior of the ICD algorithm, which can be adequately encoded as SMT
constraints.
The synthesized reprogramming attacks yield optimal effective-
ness and stealthiness with respect to a set of training EGM signals.
Weemploy themethodof [14] to generate synthetic EGMswithpre-
scribedarrhythmia.Thisallowstheattacker to synthesizemalicious
parameters tailored to the victim’s cardiac condition.
In summary, our main contributions are the following.
• We introduce, to the best of our knowledge, the first method
for the derivation of systematic reprogramming attacks on
cardiacdevicesdesigned tomaximize therapydisruptionwhile
minimizing the likelihood of detection.
• We formulate the problem of synthesizing malicious param-
eters as a multi-objective optimization problem.
• We present a method, based on OMT techniques and an effi-
cient SMT encoding of the ICD algorithm, for precisely solv-
ing this optimization problem.
• We evaluate the method by synthesizing attacks tailored to
19differentarrhytmias (i.e.,condition-specific attacks), aswell
as more generic attacks (condition-agnostic) that are suitable
when the attacker has little knowledge of the victim’s con-
dition. Our results demonstrate that arrhythmogenic condi-
tions are particularly vulnerable as only minor changes to
thedetection thresholds are sufficient toprevent the required
therapy.
• We show that our approach is suitable for real-world attacks
as it readily generalizes to unseen signals (i.e., test EGMs),
representing the unknown EGMs of the victim patient.
2 BACKGROUND
ICDsarebattery-powereddevices implantedunder thepectoralmus-
cles in the chest and connected to the cardiac muscle through one
(in single-chamber ICDs)or two (dual-chamber) leads that sense the
Figure 2: Left: illustration of a dual-chamber ICD. Original
picture by Zenhäusern & Partner, CC BY-SA 3.0 CH. Right:
sensed atrial, ventricular and shock electrograms. Event
markers label sensed impulses (AS: atrial, VT: ventricular
tachycardia) and corresponding intervals inmilliseconds.
electrical activity of the heart and deliver life-saving electrical de-
fibrillation shocks when dangerous arrhythmia is detected (see Fig-
ure 2). Shocks are delivered through shocking coils located along
the ventricular lead. To improve the battery lifetime and the dis-
comfort to the patient, modern ICDs first attempt a so-called anti-
tachycardia pacing (ATP), consisting of a burst of low-voltage im-
pulses to the ventricle, resorting to a high-energy shock only if
ATP fails. ICDs also incorporate the functionality of pacemakers,
i.e., they detect slow heart rhythm and correct it by delivering low-
voltage electrical impulses, but in this work, we focus only on the
component responsible for detecting and terminating tachycardia.
Sensedelectrical signalsarecalled intracardiacelectrograms(EGMs),
which in a dual-chamber ICD are of three types (see Figure 2): atrial
and ventricular EGMs, describing the local, near-field electrical ac-
tivity in the right atrium and ventricle, respectively; and the shock
EGM, a far-field signal that gives a global view of the electrical ac-
tivity, measured from the shock coil to the ICD can.
ICDdiscriminationalgorithmsareresponsible fordetectingtachy-
cardia episodes and initiating adequate therapybased on the sensed
EGMs. These algorithms are embedded in the device and employ
signal-processing methods such as peak detection to identify car-
diacevents; viz. electrical activationof theatriaandventricles (heart
beats). Therapy delivery depends on a number of discrimination
criteria, or discriminators, used to distinguish between potentially
fatalVentricularTachy-arrhythmias (VT)andnon-fatal Supra-Ventricular
Tachy-arrhythmias (SVTs).
Since an ICDonlyhas three signals, there are a limited number of
features that can be used as discriminators. Atrial rate, ventricular
rate, and far-field ventricularmorphology are the core features that
all major ICDmanufacturers employ; see [26] for further details on
the physiologicalmeaning of these features. To generalize to a large
variety of physiological conditions and to avoid "over-fitting" the al-
gorithm to known conditions, device manufacturers have adopted
simpledecision tree-like structures and simplediscriminators todis-
tinguish between SVT and VT.
2.1 ICD Discrimination Algorithm
Figure3 illustrates theRhythm ID algorithm implemented inBoston
Scientific (BSc) ICDs. The algorithm consists of a number of dis-
criminators arranged in a decision tree-like structure, where each
discriminator depends on one or more programmable parameters.
Synthesizing Stealthy Reprogramming Aacks on Cardiac Devices , ,
Figure 3: Discrimination tree of the Boston Scientific
Rhythm ID algorithm. White nodes denote discrimination
criteria. Any sequenceof decisions eventually leads to either
delivering (red) or not delivering (green) the therapy.
Leaves of the tree determine whether or not therapy is delivered
during the current heart cycle.
The parameters of the algorithm are given in Table 1. We con-
sider the description of the Rhythm IDalgorithmby Jiang et al. [14],
where the authors provided aMATLAB implementation of the algo-
rithm based on the manufacturer’s manuals and the medical liter-
ature [5, 29]. This implementation faithfully captures the behavior
of the Rhythm ID algorithm, as it was validated by demonstrating
conformancetoaBSccommercial ICDdeviceon11 test cases.Theal-
gorithm and its discriminators, described next, are executed at each
ventricular event, which marks the end of the corresponding heart
cycle.
D1, 8/10 faster that VF: this discriminator is true iff at least eight
out of the last ten ventricular intervals (i.e., the time between two
consecutive ventricular beats) are shorter than the programmable
threshold VFth. This discriminator detects the onset of arrhythmia
(VF in this case), as a high ventricular rate is a strong indication of
VF. If D1 is true, therapy is delivered only if the VF episode is sus-
tained. To check if VF persists, the algorithm starts the so-called VF
duration timer, as described in discriminatorD2.
D2, VFduration: when in VF durationmode, the algorithm checks
that at least six out of the last ten ventricular intervals are below
VFth, and that the last interval is below VFth. If this criterion is not
met, the algorithm exits the VF duration mode as the episode did
not persist, and thus requires no therapy. If this criterion stays true
for the entire VF duration (parameter VFdur), then therapy is given.
D3, 8/10 faster that VT: this criterion is analogous toD1, but uses
the VT threshold VTth.
D4, VTduration: this criterion is analogous toD2, but uses the VT
threshold VTth and the duration parameter VTdur. The difference
with D2 is that in this case, therapy is not given immediately at
the end of the duration timer; rather, the algorithm ensures that the
episode is not mistaken for SVT, as illustrated below.
D5,Vrate>Arate: it is true iffover the last tenheart cycles, the av-
erageventricular rate is at least 10BPM faster the average atrial rate.
Name Description Nominal (Programmable)
VFth (BPM) VF detection threshold 200 (110 :5 :210, 220 :10 :250)
VTth (BPM) VT detection threshold 160 (90 :5 :210,220)
AFibth (BPM) AFib detection threshold 170 (100 :10 :300)
VFdur (s) Sustained VF duration 1.0 (1 :0.5 :5,6 :1 :15)
VTdur (s) Sustained VT duration 2.5 (1 :0.5 :5,6 :1 :15, 20 :5 :30)
NSRcorth RhythmMatch score 0.94 (0.7 :0.01 :0.96)
stb (ms2) Stability score 20 (6 :2 :32,35 :5 :60,70 :10 :120)
Table 1: Parameters of the Rhythm ID algorithm, including
nominal and programmable values [5]. AFib: atrial fibril-
lation. n : k : m denotes the sequence n,n + k,n + 2k, ... ,m.
Thresholds are programmed in BPM (beats per minute) but
the algorithm employs the corresponding time duration.
If true,D5 indicates that tachycardiaoriginated in theventricles and
thusmust be treated. Otherwise, the algorithm inspectsD6 andD7.
D6,NSRcorrelation: thiscriterion,alsocalledRhythmMatch, com-
pares themorphology of the far-field shock EGMwith that of a pre-
computed normal sinus rhythm (NSR) template. The two signals
being similar suggests that the arrhythmia originated in the atria,
indicating SVT (no therapy). In particular, for at least three out of
the last ten heart cycles, the two signals should have a so-called fea-
ture correlation coefficient (FCC) greater than parameter NSRcorth.
The FCC is computed by looking at the voltages of the two signals at
prescribed time-points. See [5] formore details on the computation
of the FCC.
D7, AFib rate and stable Vrate: if D6 does not hold, D7 makes
the final decision on the therapy. In particular, the device diagnoses
SVT if at least six out of the last ten atrial intervals are shorter than
threshold AFibth (suggesting that the tachycardia originated in the
atria) and the ventricular rhythm is stable, i.e., the last ten ventric-
ular intervals have variance below parameter stb. Otherwise, VT is
diagnosed and therapy is initiated.
The algorithm presented in Figure 3 considers two tachycardia
zones (VF andVT branches). BSc ICDs can actually be configured to
workwith one, two, or three zones.With three zones, the algorithm
would have an additional branch (called VT-1) with discriminators
identical to those found in the VT branch but with different parame-
ters (lower detection rate and longer VT duration).We focus on two
zones because it is the most common configuration, and the two-
zone attack can easily be extended to handle one more or one less
zone.
BSc ICDs support setting a separate post-therapy configuration
of the parameters to check if therapy was successful. This is not
part of the discrimination algorithm we consider because our re-
programmingattacks arenot concernedwithpost-therapyanalysis.
Wecould have easily incorporated thepost-therapyphase, as it uses
the samediscriminators described abovebutwithpossibly different
parameter values.
Wereiterate thatdiscriminatorsD1–D7, or slightvariations thereof,
are found in other ICDmanufacturers’ algorithms. Thus, the attack-
synthesis method presented below apply to other devices as well.
2.2 Generation of Synthetic EGMs
Discriminationalgorithmsutilize two elements of EGMs for feature
extraction: timing of atrial and ventricular events, andmorphology
of far-fieldventricularevents. Jiangetal. [14]havedevelopedaheart
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model that can generate realistic synthetic EGMs that can be used
to evaluate the safety and efficacy of discrimination algorithms.
The timing of heart events is generated by a timed-automata
model of the electrical conduction system of the heart [15], which
allows simulating cardiac dynamics under different parameter set-
tings. The morphology of far-field ventricular events is sampled
from a large database of real patient EGM records [7]. EGM signals
are then synthesized by overlaying the sampled EGMmorphology
templates on the sequence of cardiac events generated by the timed
model.
Finally, different heart conditions are reproduced by running the
timed-automaton model on different parameters. For example, a
genericSVTconditionhasventricular intervals in therangeof [280,530]ms;
then, EGMs for a specific SVT condition are synthesized by uni-
formly sampling parameters from a sub-interval of this range.
Jiang et al. generated synthetic EGMs for the 19 heart conditions
specified in the RIGHT clinical trial [2], a trial designed to evaluate
the BSc discrimination algorithm. The validity and faithfulness of
these EGMs were validated by electrophysiologists. In this paper,
we therefore use the same synthetic EGM dataset. The signals are
open-loop (i.e., fixed): our attackmodel doesnot require closed-loop
modeling, as explained in Section 3.
3 ATTACKMODEL
Wepresentamodel-basedapproachtosynthesizingreprogramming
attacks on ICDs, as the attacks are not evaluated on the actual phys-
ical device but on a model of the device. The BSc algorithm model
thatweconsiderwascompiled fromdevicemanualsand themedical
literature, and faithfully reproduces the behavior of the real device
in terms of arrhythmia discrimination and therapy, as discussed in
Section 2. We focus on reprogramming attacks where the attacker
manipulates the parameter values of the victim’s ICD with the aim
of causing harm while going undetected. These two objectives are
respectively called the effectiveness and stealthiness of the attack,
and are formalized in Section 4.
An attack is effective when it compromises the decision of the
discrimination algorithm in such a way that the a required therapy
is prevented (e.g., during VF), or an inappropriate therapy is intro-
duced (e.g., during SVT). Our attackmodel is concernedwith induc-
ing at least one compromised decision, which suffices to cause ad-
verseorevenfatal effects: deprivingapatientof treatment forVFcan
lead to sudden cardiac death, while inappropriate shocks can result
in damaging heart-tissue remodeling and cause significant psycho-
logical distress [14]. Note that the unaltered parameters can them-
selves have a low rate of inappropriate ormissed therapy [2],which
is, however, negligible compared to that for malicious parameters.
In our attack model, stealthiness depends on the clinician’s abil-
ity to detect the attack. We are therefore interested in finding mali-
cious parameters that exhibit small deviations from the clinical set-
tings of the victim’s ICD, changes that are difficult for the clinician
to notice or that can be mistaken for human error. Indeed, the vic-
tim has nomeans tomonitor their ICD parameters outside of clinic,
and upon experiencing unusual activity by the ICD, s/he will likely
seek medical aid rather than suspect a cyber-attack. Hence, the in-
clinic setting is of primary interest. Moreover, the victim will likely
be unable detect the attacker on the spot, because a successful ma-
licious reprogramming does not typically induce adverse outcomes
immediately but with some delay, depending on the frequency that
the victim experiences arrhythmia and the probability that the re-
programmed parameters mis-classify that arrhythmia.
Reprogramming attacks are synthesized in an offline training
phase, which allows the attacker to obtain malicious parameters
with optimal effectiveness and stealthiness with respect to a set
of training EGM signals. Such parameters are derived by solving
a multi-objective optimization problem over a set of logical con-
straintsdescribingthebehaviorof thediscriminationalgorithmover
the training signals.We solve the problem through SMT-based tech-
niques that are guaranteed to find parameters attaining the exact
optimal effectiveness-stealthiness front (see Sections 4 and 5).
The malicious parameters synthesized in the training phase are
validated using a disjoint test dataset. In this way, we can evaluate
how the attack generalizes with previously unseen signals, which
mimic the unknown EGM of the victim.
We assume that the attacker has no knowledge of the victim’s
ICD parameters, and thus that their best strategy is to train the
attack by assuming that the default (unaltered) parameters corre-
spondto thenominalvalues (seeTable1).Therefore, thestealthiness
computedundernominal parametersmight deviate fromthatunder
the actual victim’s parameters.However, this discrepancy is limited
by the fact that condition- or patient-specific parameters tend to be
close to the nominal ones, which are considered safe for any kind of
arrhythmia requiring an ICD [19]. I.e., nominal parameters provide
a good estimate of the victim’s parameters.
Due to limited availability of real patient signals, we choose to
workwith synthetic EGMs. We remark, however, that our approach
supportsboth.TheautomatedEGMgenerationmethodofSection2.2
gives the attacker a crucial advantage: if the attacker knows that the
victim is affected by a specific arrhythmia, then it can tailor the at-
tack to thevictim inquestionbygeneratinga trainingdataset of syn-
thetic signals with that arrhythmia. In our evaluation, we consider
training datasets tailored to specific conditions (condition-specific
attacks) as well as more generic datasets that include signals for dif-
ferent arrhythmias (condition-agnostic attacks). The latter are suit-
able when the attacker has little knowledge of the victim’s condi-
tion.
Open-loop EGM signals are adequate for our purposes because
successful attacksdonotaffect thesignals inasignificantway:when
the attack prevents a required shock for an EGM with arrhythmia,
the arrhythmia persists and the EGM is unaffected; when the attack
introduces inappropriate shocks during an already normal heart
rhythm, the EGM is also unaffected, as shocks restore the electri-
cal activity of the heart to normal sinus rhythm.
Real-worldattacks. Wediscussadditional assumptions thatwould
make our model-based method suitable to real-world attacks using
radio signals via software-defined radios.
Firstly, the attacker must know the ICD model of the victim, so
that it can select the appropriate discrimination algorithm to use in
the training phase. The ICD model can be revealed by sending dis-
covery signals to the device (as shown in [10]), or from the victim’s
medical records. To change theparameter settings, the attacker also
must know the communication protocol of the ICD, which can be
reverse-engineered as also shown in [10]. In our work, we focus on
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a single discrimination algorithm. Due, however, to the universal-
ity of discriminators, our approach can be easily adapted to other
algorithms.
Secondly, the radio antenna transmitting the attack signals must
be physically close to the victim. To do so, the attacker could ap-
proach the victim (e.g., in a crowded space) or hide/disguise the
transmitter and leave it running in proximity of the victim.
Countermeasures. Previous studies have proposed methods for
preventingattacksonimplantablemedicaldevices,but todate,none
of these have been put in place by devicemanufacturers. A solution
is securing device accesses through an authentication token (smart
card, NFC device, etc.) that shares a secret key with the device. The
patientwould provide these credentials to grant the clinician access
to the device. To further secure the authentication, the key could be
derived from some of the patient’s biometrics, such as the electro-
cardiogram [28]. In emergency situations where the token might
not be available, one could restrict access from devices only at very
close proximity, as done in [23]. Finally, a simple detection method
would be notifying the patient with a beepwhenever a communica-
tion happens with the device [10].
4 PROBLEM FORMULATION
We formalize the synthesis of reprogramming attacks, (which cor-
responds to the training phase), as a multi-objective optimization
problem that seeks to derive ICD parameters achieving two main
(and contrasting) objectives: effectiveness, i.e., the attackmust maxi-
mize therapy disruption; and stealthiness, that is, the attackmust be
difficult to detect.
For a set X , X ∗ denotes the Kleene closure of X . For a sequence
x∈X ∗ , |x| denotes its lengthand, fork=0,...,|σ |−1,x[k]∈X denotes
itsk+1-st element. LetSig⊆Rm∗ be the set ofm-dimensional,finite-
length, discrete-time cardiac signals. For signal s ∈ Sig, s[k] corre-
spond to the values of atrial, ventricular and shock EGMs (m=3) at
the k+1-st sample of the signal.
Parameters are tuples p= (p1,...,pn), where pi ∈Pi is the value of
the i-th ICD parameter, and Pi is its finite domain (for each param-
eter there is a finite set of programmable values – see Table 1). We
denote with P=
producttext1n
i=1Pi the set of possible parameterizations.
From an abstract viewpoint, we can characterize a discrimina-
tion algorithm as a functiond :P−→(Sig−→B∗), whereB∗ is the set of
Boolean sequences. For parametersp∈P and signal s∈Sig,d(p)(s) is
aBoolean-valued sequencecalled a therapy signal,withasmanyele-
ments as the number of heart cycles in s. Fork < |d(p)(s)|,d(p)(s)[k]
is true if the ICD requires delivering therapy at the k-th heart cycle,
and is false otherwise. Recall from Section 2 that the discrimination
algorithm is only invoked at each ventricular event (corresponding
to the end of the heart cycle), and thus, intermediate time points be-
tween two ventricular events are not relevant to studying therapy
decisions. Note that we do not consider ICD parameters that affect
the detection of ventricular events, meaning that the length of the
therapy signal d(p)(s) stays the same for any p∈P.
Effectiveness. Let p∗ = (p∗1, ... ,p
∗
n) ∈ P be the default parameters
of ICD algorithm d , and p = (p1, ...,pn) ∈ P be an attack parameter.
The effectiveness of p is evaluated over an input dataset of signals
S ⊆ Sig (either training or test dataset), and is denoted by fe (p,S).
Figure 4: Example of attack effectiveness. Left: therapy
signal before the attack. Right: after the attack. Red cells
mark heart cycles where therapy is given.
Following our description of the attack model, we define effec-
tiveness as the proportion of signals in S where the attack prevents
the ICD from delivering any therapy when, without the attack, it
would deliver some, and forces the ICD to deliver some therapy
when, without the attack, it would deliver none:
fe (p,S)=
1
|S |
·
∑
s∈S
I
(
Rth (d,p,s),Rth (d,p
∗
,s)
)
, (1)
where I is the indicator function, andRth (d,p,s) is the therapy reach-
ability value, describing whether or not therapy is administered at
any point for signal s and parameters p:
Rth (d,p,s)=
|d (p)(s) |−1∨
k=0
d(p)(s)[k]. (2)
Therapyreachability ismotivatedby the fact thatweemploysyn-
thetic EGMs reflecting a number of arrhythmogenic (VF/VT-like)
and non-arrhythmogenic (SVT-like) situations, with the former re-
quiring device-delivered therapy and the latter requiring that such
therapy not be delivered. We deem an attack successful on an EGM
if the EGM is mis-classified in this manner.
In practice, attacks that prevent therapy during VF or VT can
be fatal (these arrhythmias can lead to sudden cardiac death [14])
and thus aremore dangerous than attacks introducing unnecessary
therapy during SVT. In our definition of effectiveness, these two
cases aregiven the same importance to avoid excessive bias towards
attacks preventing therapy. Also, VT/VF-like and SVT-like EGMs
should never occur in the same set of training or test data, because
attacks that can both prevent therapy (for VT/VF) and introduce
unnecessary therapy (for SVT) are clearly impossible.
Consider the example of Figure 4 showing a set of signals S =
{s1,...s4} of length 8 and the corresponding therapy signals for the
default (d(p∗)(s)) and reprogrammed (d(p)(s)) parameters. For sig-
nal s1, two therapy episodes occur at cycles k = 2 and k = 5, respec-
tively. In this case, the attack is not effective as itmanages to prevent
only one of the two therapies. In contrast, the attack is effective for
s2 (therapy prevented) and s3 (therapy introduced). For s4, the at-
tack only delays the therapy so it is not considered successful. The
overall effectiveness of the attack is thus 2/4=0.5.
Stealthiness. Anattack is considered stealthywhen thedeviation
between the reprogrammed parameters p and the default parame-
ters p∗ is small. To capture this deviation, we introduce a measure
of parameter distance that we seek to minimize to achieve optimal
stealthiness. Since ICD parameters can be only programmed to a fi-
nite set of values,we quantify the distance between two parameters
as the number of programmable values separating them.
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1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5 6 7
...
3 2 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Programmable values
Distance
Figure 5: Illustration of programmable values and corre-
sponding distance for parameter VTdur. The green circle
corresponds to the default setting (zero distance).
For i=1,...,n, let Pi =
{
pi1,...,p
i
ni
}
be the programmable values for
the i-th ICD parameters. W.l.o.g. assume that the values pi1, ... ,p
i
ni
are ordered. Rewrite the default parameters as p∗=
(
p1
I ∗1
,...,pn
I ∗n
)
and
the attack parameters as p =
(
p1
I1
,...,pn
In
)
, i.e., I ∗i is the index of the
element ofPi corresponding to the value of the i-th parameter in p
∗.
Ii is defined in an analogous way for p. Then, the distance between
p and p∗ is defined as:
fs (p)= max
i=1, ...,n
Ii−I ∗i . (3)
We explain (3) with an example. Suppose that the i-th parame-
ter is VTdur from Table 1, which can be programmed to any value
in the set Pi = {1, 1.5, ... , 5, 6, ... , 15, 20, ... , 30}. We set p
∗ using
the nominal value of 2.5 for VTdur, which corresponds to the 4-th
element of Pi . Hence, I
∗
i = 4. Consider attack parameters p where
VTdur is set to 4.5, i.e., the 8-th value of Pi (Ii = 8). The distance
relative to VTdur is the number of programmable values separat-
ing the default setting (2.5) and the attack (4.5), which is given byIi−I ∗i  = |8−4| = 4. Indeed, the two are separated by four pro-
grammablevalues (3,3.5,4,4.5).Theoverall distance is themaximum
separation over all ICD parameters. See Figure 5.
This notion of distance assumes that parameters are equipped
with a linear order, which is the case for all numeric parameters of
the BSc ICDalgorithm. For categorical parameters, one could either
assign the samedistance to all categories different from thenominal
one, or repeat the synthesis for each category.
Optimal stealthy attacks. We formulate the synthesis of stealthy
reprogramming attacks as a multi-objective optimization problem,
wherewe seek to optimize effectiveness and stealthiness (maximize
fe and minimize fs ) of the parameters w.r.t. a set of training EGMs.
Multi-objective optimization allowsone to derive theoptimal trade-
offbetweenmultiple, possibly contrastingobjectives, implying that
wedonot need to assumeanyweight or priority ordering for theob-
jectives. The result of this analysis is a so-called Pareto front, i.e., a
set of non-dominated points in the objective space of possible effec-
tiveness and parameter distance values.
Problem 1 (Reprogramming attack synthesis). For effective-
ness objective fe and distance objective fs , training set of signals S ⊆
Sig, find the set P of Pareto-optimal parameters, i.e.:
P= {p∈P |∄p′∈P. (fe (p
′
,S)> fe (p,S)∧ fs (p
′)≤ fs (p)) ∨
(fe (p
′
,S)≥ fe (p,S)∧ fs (p
′)< fs (p))}. (4)
Consider for instance two parameters p1 and p2, such that for
some S , fe (p1,S)= 0.5, fe (p2,S)= 0.7, fs (p1)= 5, and fs (p2)= 5. p2
has better effectiveness than p1 and same distance, so p2 dominates
p1, meaning that p1 cannot be in the Pareto-optimal front. p2 is in
the Pareto-optimal front if there are no parameters that dominate it.
To quantify how well the attacks generalize to unseen data, we
introduce a validation score defined as the average deviation of the
attack effectiveness between training and test data.
Given a training set S , a set of Pareto-optimal parameters Pwith
respect to S , and a test set S ′, we define the validation score as:∑
p∈P(fe (p,S
′) − fe (p,S))/|P|. Positive values indicate that the pa-
rameters P have better performance with unseen data than with
trainingdata,whereasnegativevalues imply theopposite.Note that
the validation score need not consider stealthiness because this is
independent of the signals.
5 OMT ENCODING
In this section,wepresent a solutionmethod for the reprogramming
attack synthesis problem (Problem 1).We formalize the behavior of
the BSc discrimination algorithm in the framework of Satisfiability
Modulo Theories (SMT) [1], within which the ICD algorithm is de-
scribed as a set of first-order formulas over some (decidable) back-
ground theory. Parameters are represented as uninterpreted con-
stants in the SMT encoding, and parameter synthesis corresponds
tofindinga satisfiableassignment to thoseconstants, i.e., a so-called
model. In particular, we formulate Problem 1 as an Optimization
ModuloTheories (OMT) problem, i.e., an extension of SMT for find-
ing models that optimize given objectives [4].
The synthesis of optimal reprogramming attacks is difficult as it
entails solving a combinatorial multi-objective optimization prob-
lem (non-continuous, non-convex) constrained by the behavior of
the discrimination algorithm, which cannot be captured by simple
(in)equality constraints. Therefore, classical optimization methods
such as linear or convex programming are not suitable, while non-
linear optimization techniques such as genetic algorithms would
provide only sub-optimal solutions. In contrast, OMT is uniquely
suited to solve this problem, as the ICDalgorithmcanbe adequately
encoded as SMT constraints and the parameters found by OMT are
guaranteed to be optimal.
Sinceweare interested inanalyzingthebehaviorof thealgorithm
offline over a fixed set of EGM signals,we can pre-compute for each
signal the non-linear operations underlying someof the discrimina-
tors, such as the RhythmMatch score. This allows us to encode the
problem over the decidable theory of quantifier-free linear integer
real arithmetic (SMTQF_LIRA). Importantly, we pre-compute only
the operations that are not affected by the ICD parameters, mean-
ing that our encoding accounts for all possible behaviors induced
by different parametrizations.
W.l.o.g. assume that the training dataset S is indexed. The behav-
ior of the algorithm for the j-th signal is described by a sequence of
symbolic states sj,0,...sj,Nj , one for each cardiac cycle, where Nj is
the number of cycles in the j-th signal. The evolution of the discrim-
ination algorithm over the training signals is characterized by the
following formula (inspired by boundedmodel checking [3]):
paramRanges∧
|S |∧
j=1
©­«Init(sj,0)∧
Nj−1∧
k=0
T (k,sj,k ,sj,k+1)
ª®¬ (5)
where paramRanges is a predicate describing the programmable
values of the ICD parameters (see Table 1); Init(sj,0) is the predicate
forconstrainingthe initial stateof thealgorithm,andT (k,sj,k ,sj,k+1)
is the transition relation determining from the current state and
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heart cycle, the admissible states of the algorithm at the next cycle.
In our case, the transition relation is deterministic, i.e., for fixed sj,k
and k , there exists only one state sj,k+1 such that T (k,sj,k ,sj,k+1)
holds. In (5), states sj,k are implicitly existentially quantified.
In the BSc algorithm, the state sj,k for the j-th signal and k-th
heart cycle is represented by
sj,k
def
= (VFdj,k,VTdj,k,tVFj,k,tVTj,k) ∈B×B×Z
≥×Z≥,
whereVFdj,k andVTdj,k tellwhether or not the algorithm is, respec-
tively, in the VF duration and VT durationmode, with tVFj,k,tVTj,k
beingtheclocks thatkeep trackof timespent in therespectivemodes.
The clocks are digital (∈ Z≥) and measure the time in milliseconds.
Note that the value of the therapy signal is not part of the state but,
as we shall see, is encoded as a state predicate.
For any signal j, the initial state of the algorithm is given by the
following Init predicate
Init(sj,0)=¬VFdj,k ∧ ¬VTdj,k ∧ tVFj,k=0 ∧ tVTj,k=0,
indicating that the algorithm is in neither duration mode and that
the clocks are set to zeros.
An example path of the BSc algorithm encoding is given below.
s
k
−→s ′ denotes a transition between states s and s ′ at the k-th heart
cycle, i.e., such thatT (k,s,s ′) holds.
. . .
12
−→(⊥,⊥,0,0)
13
−→(⊥,⊤,0,0)
14
−→(⊥,⊤,0,309)
15
−→ . . .
. . .
25
−→(⊥,⊤,0,2317)
26
−→(⊥,⊥,0,0).
The transition at k = 13 marks the start of VT duration (VTd passes
from⊥ to⊤). The algorithm stays in VT duration for 13 more heart
cycles during which the episode persists, until it reaches the end of
the timer: at the start of the 26-th cycle the VT clock evaluates to
tVF = 2317, but at the end of the cycle, the clock would exceed the
VT duration parameter which, in this example, is set to the nominal
value VTdur= 2500 milliseconds1. At this point, it delivers therapy
and resets the VT clock, going back to state (⊥,⊥,0,0).
Transition relation. The transition relation encodes the behavior
of the discrimination algorithm presented in Section 2. For the sake
of simplicity, we omit the signal index from the equations below.
T (k,sk ,sk+1)=
((VFstartk∧(¬VFdk∨VFendk))⇒VFdk+1) (6)
∧((VTstartk∧(¬VTdk∨VTendk))⇒VTdk+1) (7)
∧((¬VFdk∧¬VFstartk)⇒¬VFdk+1) (8)
∧((¬VTdk∧¬VTstartk)⇒¬VTdk+1) (9)
∧((VFdk∧¬VFstartk∧VFendk)⇒¬VFdk+1) (10)
∧((VTdk∧¬VTstartk∧VTendk)⇒¬VTdk+1) (11)
∧((VFdk∧¬VFendk)⇒(VFdk+1∧tVFk+1=tVFk+Vintk)) (12)
∧((VTdk∧¬VTendk)⇒(VTdk+1∧tVTk+1=tVTk+Vintk)) (13)
∧((¬VFdk∨VFendk)⇒ tVFk+1=0) (14)
∧((¬VTdk∨VTendk)⇒ tVTk+1=0) (15)
(6)establishes thatVFdurationstarts in thenext state (VFdk+1holds)
whenpredicateVFstartk holdsandwearenot inVFduration(¬VFdk)
1To produce a concrete path, wemust fix an interpretation for the ICD parameters.
or the current VF durationmode just ended (VFendk). (7) is the anal-
ogous for theVT zone. PredicateVFstartk encodes thefirst discrimi-
natorof theBScalgorithm(last 8/10ventricular intervals faster than
VFth), and is defined by:
VFstartk=
(
9∑
n=0
ite(Vintk−n <VFth,1,0)
)
≥8 (16)
where ite is the if-then-else function, andVintk is thedurationof the
ventricular interval for the k-th cycle. Ventricular intervals are pre-
computed from the input signals and thus have fixed interpretation
in the SMT encoding. Predicate VFendk is defined as:
VFendk= VFclkOverk∨¬VFpersistk, where (17)
VFclkOverk= tVFk+Vintk ≥VFdur (18)
VFpersistk=
(
9∑
n=1
ite(Vintk−n <VFth,1,0)
)
≥5∧Vintk <VFth . (19)
VFendk is true when the episode does not persist (VFpersistk en-
codes the second BSc discriminator), or when the duration expires,
i.e.,VFclkOverk holds (tVFk+Vintk is the time spent in VF duration
at the end of the k-th cycle). VFth and VFdur are uninterpreted con-
stants representing the (unknown) ICD parameters to synthesize
for the VF detection threshold and VF duration, respectively. Pred-
icates VTstartk , VFendk, VTpersistk and VTclkOverk are defined in
an analogous way for the VT zone. (8) tells that if we are not in
VF duration and VFstartk does not hold, then VF duration cannot
start in the next state. (9) is the analogous of (8) for the VT zone.
(10) and (11) handle the situationwhen the algorithm exits from the
VF and VT duration modes, respectively, and a new duration can-
not start because no new episode is detected (i.e., in the case of VF,
¬VFstartk holds). (12) and (13) consider the opposite situation that
the algorithm stays in the VF/VT durationmode, in which case the
correspondingclock isupdated. (14)and (15) express that theVFand
VT duration clocks are set to zerowhen the algorithm is outside the
corresponding duration mode, or the mode has just ended.
Finally,we introduce thepredicateThk indicatingwhetherornot
therapy is administered at the k-th cycle, in this way providing a
symbolic representation of the therapy signal, i.e., for signal s and
parameters p, Thk corresponds tod(p)(s)[k].
Thk= (VFdk∧VFpersistk∧VFclkOverk)∨
(VTdk∧VTpersistk∧VTclkOverk∧(D5k∨¬(D6k∨D7k))). (20)
The formula captures the discrimination tree presented in Section 2.
D5k,D6k,D7k encode the last three BSc discriminators. D5k is true
if the average ventricular rate is at least 10 BPM faster the average
atrial rate. D5k does not depend on any ICD parameter and thus, is
pre-computed for improving efficiency. D6k andD7k are given by:
D6k=
(
9∑
n=0
ite(FCCk−n ≥NSRcorth,1,0)
)
≥3 (21)
D7k=
(
9∑
n=0
ite(Aintk′−n <AFibth,1,0)
)
≥6∧Vvark ≤ stb (22)
where FCCk and Vvark are pre-computed constants, respectively
indicating the Rhythm Match score and the variance of the last 10
ventricular intervals. Aintk′−n is the pre-computed duration of the
(k ′−n)-th atrial interval, where k ′ is the number of atrial intervals
occurred within k heart cycles. NSRcorth, AFibth and stb are the
symbolic encoding of the corresponding ICD parameters.
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Effectiveness and stealthiness encoding. We show how to encode
effectiveness maximization as a MaxSMT problem. For each signal
j, we define the following soft constraint:
effectivej =
©­«Rth∗j =¬
Nj−1∨
k=0
Thk
ª®¬, (23)
where Rth∗j is the therapy reachability value (telling whether or not
therapy is administered at any point) for signal j and default param-
eters. Rth∗j can be pre-computed for efficiency.
∨Nj−1
k=0
Thk repre-
sents the therapy reachability value for the attack parameters, and
thus, effectivej is true if the attackdisrupts thedefault therapy.Note
that maximizing the effectiveness fe defined in (1) is equivalent to
maximizing the number of effectivej constraints satisfied. Hence
the MaxSMT formulation.
Parameter distance is encoded as an uninterpreted integer con-
stant to minimize, dist. Recall that we measure distance between
two parameters as the number of programmable values separating
them, and that inBSc ICDs, anyparameter has afinite number of nu-
meric programmable values. It follows that dist has a finite domain,
i.e. dist∈ {0,1,...,distmax}
2.
We encode dist in an implicit way, that is, we do not add con-
straints for (3) but we restrict the parameter domains conditioned
on the distance value as follows:
distmax∧
s=0
dist ≤s⇒
(
n∧
i=1
piL ≤Pi ≤p
i
U
)
, (24)
wherePi is theSMTencodingof thei-thparameter,L=max
{
I ∗i −s,1
}
,
and U = min
{
I ∗i +s,ni
}
. In other words, pi
L
is the s-th closest left
neighbor of Pi ’s default value, p
i
U
is its s-th closest right neighbor.
Therefore, pi
L
≤ Pi ≤ p
i
U
restricts the domain of Pi to values with
distance at most s , fromwhich the correctness of (24) follows.
To clarify this encoding, below is shown part of the concrete in-
stantiation of (24) relative to parameter VTdur:
(dist ≤0⇒(. . .∧2500 ≤VTdur ≤2500∧ . . .))∧
(dist ≤1⇒(. . .∧2000 ≤VTdur ≤3000∧ . . .))∧
(dist ≤2⇒(. . .∧1500 ≤VTdur ≤3500∧ . . .))∧ . . .
Synthesis of Pareto-optimal attacks. The OMT solver returns the
set of Pareto-optimal objective values, i.e., the set of all (s,e) pairs
such that s = fs (p) and e = fe (p,S) for some Pareto-optimal param-
eter p ∈ P w.r.t. training set S . For each (s,e), the solver computes
a witness p′ yielding that Pareto-optimal objective value. The syn-
thesized parameters is the set of all such p′. This implies that we
synthesize a subset of P since the witness might not be unique, but
do not exclude any (s,e) in the space of Pareto-optimal objectives.
6 RESULTS ANDDISCUSSION
We apply our method to the synthesis of condition-specific attacks.
We employ synthetic EGMs for 19 different conditions, generated
through the method of Section 2.2, and synthesize Pareto-optimal
parameters using a training set of 100 signals for each condition.We
validate theattackswith test setsof 50 signalsper condition (disjoint
2distmax=maxi=1, . . .,nmax
{
ni −I
∗
i , I
∗
i −1
}
, whereni is the number of programmable
values for the i -th parameter and I ∗i is the index of its default value.
Condition Effectiveness Distance |P | V. score Time |σ |
1 SVT 0.338 [0.02,0.87] 15.5 [13,18] 6 -0.0217 776 57.59 [53,62]
2 SVT 0.397 [0.04,0.92] 15.5 [13,18] 6 -0.0433 459 58.19 [55,63]
3 VT 0.497 [0.01,1.00] 6.583 [1,13] 12 -0.0033 4776 90.48 [81,100]
4 VT 0.561 [0.01,1.00] 9.583 [4,16] 12 0.0025 8208 84.64 [74,95]
5 SVT 0.505 [0.01,1.00] 9.154 [1,17] 13 -0.0523 1894 64.3 [58,70]
6 SVT 0.298 [0.03,0.55] 10 [4,18] 9 0.02 455 61.03 [54,73]
7 VT 0.504 [0.01,1.00] 9.357 [2,16] 14 -0.0593 5270 84.36 [75,96]
8 SVT 0.170 [0.01,0.48] 9.5 [7,12] 6 -0.05 460 48.64 [42, 57]
9 SVT 0 [0,0] 0 [0,0] 1 0 279 47.72 [44,51]
10 VT 0.565 [0.01,1.00] 7.091 [2,13] 11 -0.0518 4739 89.34 [80,102]
11 SVT 0.033 [0.01,0.06] 11 [10,12] 3 -0.0267 343 45.87 [43,52]
12 SVT 0.326 [0.01,0.75] 11.385 [3,18] 13 -0.0077 876 59.39 [54,66]
13 SVT 0.084 [0.01,0.20] 16 [14,18] 5 -0.036 363 50.38 [46,56]
14 SVT 0.067 [0.01,0.16] 15.333 [12,18] 6 -0.01 539 52.01 [48,59]
15 SVT 0.498 [0.01,0.92] 13.5 [11,16] 6 0.0083 374 51.23 [36,60]
16 VT 0.468 [0.02,0.99] 6 [1,11] 11 -0.0064 4419 89.06 [80,100]
17 VT 0.490 [0.05,1.00] 10.6 [6,16] 10 -0.004 2699 84.82 [75,95]
18 VT 0.517 [0.04,1.00] 10.7 [6,16] 10 -0.009 2489 84.45 [75,95]
19 VT 0.506 [0.04,1.00] 10.6 [6,16] 10 -0.02 2812 84.87 [75,96]
Table 2: Statistics for Pareto-optimal condition-specific
parameters. Effectiveness and parameter distance are in the
form µ[m,M] (mean µ, minimumm, maximum M objective
function value for all solutions). |P| is the number of Pareto-
optimal solutions.V. score is the validation score. Time is the
runtime in seconds. |σ | is the length of the training signals,
in the form µ[m,M] (mean,min, max).
from the training sets). In our experiments, we found that the per-
formance with unseen test signals stays relatively constant for any
training set size larger than 40; see Figure 8 in the Appendix. Thus,
100 training signals provide a sufficiently complete representation
of the signal space.All EGMshaveadurationof 30 seconds, but their
lengths – given by the number of heart cycles – vary depending on
the ventricular interval duration.
These 19 arrythmias can be broadly classified in two categories:
VT and SVT. The former consists of arrythmias where themajority
of signals require ICD therapy (based on the nominal parameters),
and thus, it covers both VT and VF. The latter includes conditions
where most of the signals do not require therapy. In particular, we
have 8VTand 11 SVT conditions,with all VT signals requiring ther-
apy at some point and all SVT signals not requiring any therapy.
Wealso synthesize condition-agnostic attacks, suitablewhen the
attacker has little knowledge of the victim. Specifically,we consider
two attacks for generic VT and SVT conditions, using training sets
of 200 EGMs derived by randomly choosing among the 8 VT-like
conditions and the 11 SVT conditions, respectively. We validate the
two attacks with disjoint test sets of 100 signals.
Themethod for generating synthetic EGMswas implemented in
MATLAB. For parameter synthesis, we used the z3 SMT solver [4].
Condition-specific attacks. Table 2 provides statistics on the syn-
thesized Pareto-optimal attacks. Figure 6 shows the Pareto-optimal
fronts for a selection of representative conditions (see Figure 7 in
the appendix for the full set). The synthesized parameters for all
conditions are in Tables 4-21 of the appendix.
Remarkably, the synthesized attacks attain validation scores that
are either positive or very close to zero, indicating that the attacks
generalizewell with unseen data and, thus,would have comparable
effectiveness when applied to the unknown EGM of the victim.
As visible in Table 2, our method can derive effective attacks for
allVTconditions, since thecorrespondingPareto fronts always con-
tain a parametrization able to affect the therapy of all training sig-
nals (effectiveness 1), with the exception of condition 16 where the
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maximum effectiveness is 0.99. However, not all attacks on VT con-
ditions are comparably stealthy (see Figure 6). For instance, for con-
dition10aparameter distanceof 7 ensures that theattack is effective
with half of the training signals, while for condition 17, the same ef-
fectiveness level isobtainedonlyatadistanceof11 fromthenominal
parameters (worse stealthiness).
In contrast, attacks on SVT conditions are not all equally suc-
cessful. For condition 5 we can find parameters with 100% effective-
ness as well as stealthier attacks that e.g. are able to affect almost
40% of the signals with a distance of only 5. For conditions 2 and 15
we obtain parameters with nearly 100% effectiveness but with poor
stealthiness (the minimal distance of a Pareto-optimal attack is 13
and 11, respectively). SomeEGMs turned out to bedifficult to attack.
Specifically, for condition 11 the strongest attack affects only 6% of
the signals and, for condition 9, no Pareto-optimal attacks exist but
the trivial one that leaves the nominal parameters unchanged.
The reasonwhyVT conditions are easier to attack is that it takes
only aminor increase to theVTandVFdetection thresholds (param-
eters VFth and VTth) to make the ICD mis-classify a tachyarrhyth-
miaepisode.Ontheotherhand,VFth andVTthmustbereprogrammed
to very low values for the ICD to classify a slow heart rate as VT
or VF to induce unnecessary therapy. This is not always possible
because in SVT conditions, the heart rate is often below the lowest
programmable values forVFth (110BPM) andVTth (90BPM),which
explainswhy, for instance,noattackparameters exist that canaffect
condition 9. We remark that these results are provably correct be-
cause OMT is guaranteed to find Pareto-optimal attack parameters,
when they exist.
Besides increasing VFth and VTth, the attacks on VT conditions
synthesized by our method tend to increase the VF and VT dura-
tions (VFdur and VTdur) thus reducing the probability that the ICD
classifies an episode as sustained, which is a necessary condition
for delivering therapy. For instance, the most effective attack for
condition 10 has VFth = 250 BPM, VTth = 205 BPM, VFdur = 10 s,
and VTdur = 13 s, against nominal values of 200, 160, 1, and 2.5,
respectively. For some VT conditions, the attacks also tamper with
the VT zone-related parameters: they decrease the Rhythm Match
score NSRcorth and the detection threshold for atrial fibrillation
AFibth, while increasing the stability score (parameter stb), making
discriminators D6 and D7 more likely to be satisfied thus tricking
the ICD into classifying the episode as SVT. Indeed, for condition
10 themost effective reprogramming has NSRcorth=0.86 (nominal
0.94), AFibth=100 BPM (nominal 170), and stb=35 (nominal 20).
Figure 7 compares nominal and reprogrammed parameters over
an execution of the BSc algorithm at the start of a VF episode, us-
ing an EGM from condition 10. With nominal parameters, VF dura-
tion starts after the last 8/10 ventricular intervals faster thanVF (see
marker 1 in Fig. 7) and ends after an interval is found below the VF
threshold (see marker 2). A new VF duration can start right away,
ending this time with a therapy (marker T).
In thisexample, thereprogrammingsetsVFth =240BPM(250ms),
VFth=185 BPM (325 ms), and VTdur=7 s (corresponding to param-
eter #6 in Table 12 of the appendix). With the higher VF threshold,
the attack leads tomarking the VF episode as VT, triggering VT du-
ration (marker 3). VT duration ends with one interval found below
the reprogrammedVT threshold (marker 4).AnewVTduration can
start right away, but therapy is prevented due to the long VTdur.
Attacks on SVT conditions follow the opposite strategy. They
tend to keep VFth, VTth, VFdur and VTdur to the minimum pro-
grammable values, thus increasing the probability that slow heart
rhythms are classified as a sustained tachyarrhythmia episode. An
example iscondition5, forwhichthemosteffectiveattackhasVFth=
115 BPM, VTth = 110 BPM, VFdur = 1 s and VTdur = 1 s. Such an
attack is 100% successful regardless the other VT zone-related pa-
rameters, while for other SVT conditions we also need to increase
theRhythmMatch threshold. In contrast, theparameters of discrim-
inator D7, AFibth and stb, appear to have little effect.
Condition-agnosticattacks. Pareto fronts for thecondition-agnos-
ticattacksonVTandSVT,hereafter referred toasVTattackandSVT
attack, are shown in Figure 8. The corresponding parameters are
available in Tables 22 and 23 of the appendix. These attacks attain
very good validation scores, comparable to the condition-specific
scores, suggesting that our method can generalize well also with
heterogeneous arrhythmias. The Pareto front for the VT attack has
a similar profile to those for the condition-specific attacks: the ef-
fectiveness is poor for parameter distance below 5, it has a sharp
increase between distance 5 and 10, growing slowly after that up to
reaching100%success at distance16.Theattack strategy is the same
discussed for the condition-specific case: as the parameter distance
grows, our method finds parameters with gradually higher values
forVFth,VTth,VFdur,VTdurand stb, and lowervalues forNSRcorth
and Afibth.
Ontheotherhand, theparameters for theSVTattackreachamax-
imum effectiveness of 49% at distance 18, compatibly with the fact
that condition-specific attacks are reasonably successful only for a
subset of SVT conditions. The attack strategy confirmsour previous
discussion,with the synthesized parameters havingminimal values
of VFth, VTth, VFdur and VTdur.
Performanceandadequacy. Performanceresults for thesynthesis
of condition-specific attacks, reported in Table 2, show that VT con-
ditions are more computationally demanding than SVT ones, with
runtimes ranging from2489 to 8208 seconds versus a rangeof 279 to
1894 seconds for SVT. The reason is that VT conditions are charac-
terized by shorter ventricular intervals, leading tomore heart beats
for the same EGM duration and thus, to longer signals. The path
length and the number of training signals are indeed the main fac-
tors affecting the complexity of OMT-based synthesis.
We demonstrate the adequacy of our approach by showing that
the parameters synthesized throughOMT comfortably outperform
those found by a random search (RS). For this purpose, we ran RS
for each condition and for the same runtime of OMT, and compared
the area under the curve (AUC) of the Pareto fronts obtained with
OMTandRS,with both training and test EGMs.HigherAUCvalues
imply better performance.We remark that the parameters found by
OMT are guaranteed to be Pareto-optimal with respect to training
EGMs, and so RS (or any other optimization method) cannot have
better performance on the training data. Indeed, RS yields AUC val-
ues strictly less than OMT for all conditions except 18 and 19, for
which RS and OMT produced the same Pareto fronts (see Table 24
in theAppendix for the full set ofAUCvalues).With test data, OMT
outperforms RS on 11 conditions, while the opposite happens only
for three conditions. For the remaining conditions, OMT and RS
, , N. Paolei et al.
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Figure 6: Pareto fronts for condition-specific reprogramming attacks. Blue dots represent the Pareto front obtained with
training signals. Green crosses indicate the effectiveness of the synthesized parameters on the test signals. Only a selection of
representative conditions are included, see Figure 7 in the appendix for the full set of plots.
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Figure 7: Execution of BSc discrimination algorithm with
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Figure 8: Pareto fronts for condition-agnostic reprogram-
ming attacks. Legend is as in Figure 6.
have equal AUC values. These results confirm that OMT exhibits
superior performance also with regard to unseen signals.
7 RELATEDWORK
Thework of Halperin and colleagues [10] was the first to show that
ICDs can be accessed and reprogrammed by unauthorized users us-
ing off-the-shelf hardware. Unlike our work, however, they did not
provide automatedmethods to derive stealthy attacks, nor did they
consider the problemof tailoring the attacks based on the heart con-
dition. Rather, they simply showed that they can disable all thera-
pies, an attackwhich is easily detectable. Other examples are spoof-
ing attacks on ICDs [16], attacks on insulinpumps andglucosemon-
itors [18], and on electrocardiogram-based biometrics [6].
Thework of Jiang et al. [14] offers amodel-based approach to an-
alyze the accuracy ICD algorithms by conducting in-silico trials on
synthetic cardiac signals. Ourwork relies on [14] for the generation
of synthetic EGMs and the reverse-engineering of the Boston Sci-
entific algorithm, but tackles the fundamentally different problem
of designing stealthy attacks on ICDs, introducing a novel formal-
ization of attack synthesis as multi-objective optimization, and an
SMT-based encoding for its solution. In [17], an SMT-basedmethod
is presented for the synthesis of cardiac pacemaker parameters that
ensure safe heart rhythm and maximize robustness to parameter
deviations. There are substantial differences between [17] and our
work, both in the problem under study (improving the pacemaker
function versus compromising the ICD function), and in the kind
of devices considered: pacemakers help correct slow heart rhythms
through low-voltage electrical pulses, and thus follow completely
different algorithms from ICDs.
Related research include model-based methods for attack detec-
tion and identification in cyber-physical systems [11, 21, 27] and
methods for securestateestimation, i.e., for reconstructingtheplant
state from attack-prone sensor data [8, 20], some of which employ,
as we do, SMT-based techniques to this purpose [25].
SAT-based software verification techniques are applied in [12]
for the synthesis of spoofing-attacks on control systems.
8 CONCLUSIONS
The lives of millions of patients rely on the correct functioning of
implantable cardiac devices. As demonstrated by recent security-
related recalls, vulnerabilities in these devices exist, which can be
exploited to put the patient’s safety in jeopardy through the mali-
cious reprogramming of the device.
Motivated by the need to improve the security, safety and robust-
ness of such devices, we presented the first framework for system-
atically synthesizing reprogramming attacks on ICDs designed to
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maximize therapy disruption while minimizing detection. Such at-
tacks can therefore be tailored to the victim’s physiology through
condition-specific synthetic cardiac signals.
Our approach builds on automated reasoning methods (OMT)
that allowed us to synthesize malicious parameters that precisely
attain Pareto-optimal performance w.r.t. stealthiness and effective-
ness criteria.We demonstrated that such attacks are particularly ef-
fective in preventing therapy in the presence of VT andVF, and that
they readily generalize to unseen signals. This makes our approach
suitable for real-world attacks.
For future work, we plan to evaluate synthesized attacks on a
real ICD device, building on the hardware testbed for cardiac pace-
makers of [13]. We will also investigate spoofing attacks on EGM
sensors and techniques for making ICD discrimination algorithms
more resilient to such attacks.
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A SUPPLEMENTARYMATERIAL
Effectiveness ≥
Condition 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
1 SVT 15 16 16 17 17 18 18 18 NA NA
2 SVT 15 15 16 17 17 17 17 18 18 NA
3 VT 4 6 6 7 7 8 8 9 9 13
4 VT 6 7 8 9 9 9 10 11 13 16
5 SVT 3 3 5 11 13 13 14 14 15 17
6 SVT 6 6 8 17 18 NA NA NA NA NA
7 VT 6 7 8 9 9 10 11 13 16 16
8 SVT 10 11 11 12 NA NA NA NA NA NA
10 VT 4 5 6 7 7 7 8 8 9 13
11 SVT NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
12 SVT 8 8 10 15 17 18 18 NA NA NA
13 SVT 17 18 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
14 SVT 17 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
15 SVT 13 13 13 14 14 14 14 15 16 NA
16 VT 3 5 6 7 7 8 8 9 9 NA
17 VT 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 16 16 16
18 VT 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 13 16 16
19 VT 7 8 9 10 11 13 13 13 16 16
Table 3: Distance of reprogramming attack required to
achieve given effectiveness levels. NA entries indicate that
the no parameter exists yielding that effectiveness level.
Condition 1
# VFth VTth VFdur VTdur NSRcorth AFibth stb Eff. Dist.
1 445 546 1.0 2.0 0.96 546 18 0.02 13
2 462 546 1.0 2.0 0.96 546 18 0.04 14
3 480 500 1.0 8.0 0.94 375 18 0.17 15
4 500 522 1.0 9.0 0.88 375 18 0.34 16
5 522 546 1.0 3.5 0.94 375 18 0.59 17
6 546 600 1.0 7.0 0.96 546 18 0.87 18
Table 4: Pareto-optimal reprogramming attacks for condi-
tion 1. Detection thresholds are expressed as duration in
milliseconds instead of BPM frequency.
Condition 2
# VFth VTth VFdur VTdur NSRcorth AFibth stb Eff. Dist.
1 445 462 1.0 1.0 0.96 600 8 0.04 13
2 462 572 1.0 14.0 0.96 600 8 0.09 14
3 480 572 1.0 14.0 0.96 600 8 0.22 15
4 500 572 1.0 14.0 0.96 600 8 0.39 16
5 522 572 1.0 25.0 0.96 600 8 0.72 17
6 546 572 1.0 14.0 0.96 600 8 0.92 18
Table 5: Pareto-optimal reprogramming attacks for condi-
tion 2. Units are as in Table 4.
Condition 3
# VFth VTth VFdur VTdur NSRcorth AFibth stb Eff. Dist.
1 293 388 1.5 3.0 0.94 353 18 0.01 1
2 286 388 2.0 3.5 0.94 375 20 0.04 2
3 286 364 2.5 3.5 0.91 429 24 0.09 3
4 261 353 3.0 4.5 0.90 462 12 0.13 4
5 293 343 3.5 5.0 0.94 462 28 0.18 5
6 261 334 4.0 6.0 0.91 546 18 0.34 6
7 240 325 2.0 7.0 0.91 500 10 0.54 7
8 240 316 2.0 8.0 0.91 600 35 0.76 8
9 261 308 6.0 9.0 0.90 231 45 0.91 9
10 261 300 3.5 10.0 0.88 223 50 0.97 10
11 240 293 8.0 11.0 0.88 215 50 0.99 11
12 240 273 10.0 13.0 0.81 200 70 1.00 13
Table 6: Pareto-optimal reprogramming attacks for condi-
tion 3. Units are as in Table 4.
Condition 4
# VFth VTth VFdur VTdur NSRcorth AFibth stb Eff. Dist.
1 286 353 2.5 4.0 0.90 286 28 0.01 4
2 293 353 3.5 5.0 0.89 316 30 0.05 5
3 250 334 2.0 6.0 0.89 429 30 0.12 6
4 250 325 4.5 7.0 0.89 316 35 0.22 7
5 250 316 4.5 8.0 0.89 334 40 0.38 8
6 250 308 4.0 9.0 0.90 334 45 0.68 9
7 250 300 1.0 9.0 0.90 316 50 0.76 10
8 240 293 2.5 9.0 0.84 300 55 0.80 11
9 250 286 9.0 12.0 0.90 300 60 0.86 12
10 240 273 1.0 10.0 0.81 300 70 0.92 13
11 250 273 10.0 10.0 0.80 429 80 0.93 14
12 250 462 2.5 20.0 0.78 200 55 1.00 16
Table 7: Pareto-optimal reprogramming attacks for condi-
tion 4. Units are as in Table 4.
Condition 5
# VFth VTth VFdur VTdur NSRcorth AFibth stb Eff. Dist.
1 308 414 1.0 2.0 0.95 353 22 0.01 1
2 316 429 1.0 1.5 0.96 400 24 0.09 2
3 273 445 1.0 1.0 0.91 316 26 0.24 3
4 300 462 1.0 1.0 0.90 316 28 0.27 4
5 334 480 1.0 1.0 0.89 316 30 0.34 5
6 240 500 1.0 1.0 0.88 316 28 0.39 6
7 414 546 1.0 1.0 0.85 316 28 0.42 11
8 429 546 1.0 1.0 0.86 316 28 0.45 12
9 445 522 1.0 1.0 0.85 316 60 0.60 13
10 462 667 1.0 2.0 0.85 316 80 0.82 14
11 480 522 1.0 1.0 0.85 316 26 0.95 15
12 500 522 1.0 1.0 0.85 316 45 0.98 16
13 522 546 1.0 1.0 0.85 316 35 1.00 17
Table 8: Pareto-optimal reprogramming attacks for condi-
tion 5. Units are as in Table 4.
Condition 6
# VFth VTth VFdur VTdur NSRcorth AFibth stb Eff. Dist.
1 334 414 1.0 1.5 0.96 462 26 0.03 4
2 343 429 1.0 1.5 0.95 375 18 0.08 5
3 353 500 1.0 1.5 0.96 546 30 0.20 6
4 364 522 1.0 7.0 0.88 375 18 0.29 7
5 375 429 1.0 2.0 0.95 375 18 0.34 8
6 388 500 1.0 1.5 0.96 600 45 0.38 9
7 500 572 1.0 9.0 0.79 375 18 0.39 16
8 522 572 1.0 25.0 0.79 400 18 0.42 17
9 546 667 1.0 30.0 0.77 375 18 0.55 18
Table 9: Pareto-optimal reprogramming attacks for condi-
tion 6. Units are as in Table 4.
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Figure 9: Pareto fronts for condition-specific reprogramming attacks. Blue dots represent the Pareto front obtained with
training signals. Green crosses indicate the performance of the synthesized parameters on the test signals. Front for condition
9 is omitted as it only contains the trivial solution (0,0).
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Condition 7
# VFth VTth VFdur VTdur NSRcorth AFibth stb Eff. Dist.
1 286 375 1.5 1.5 0.92 334 24 0.01 2
2 273 364 2.5 4.0 0.91 334 26 0.04 3
3 273 364 2.0 5.0 0.90 286 28 0.07 5
4 261 334 1.0 6.0 0.91 546 32 0.12 6
5 273 325 4.5 6.0 0.90 375 35 0.22 7
6 261 316 4.5 6.0 0.86 353 40 0.36 8
7 250 308 5.0 9.0 0.90 300 45 0.54 9
8 240 300 1.0 10.0 0.84 316 50 0.63 10
9 261 293 8.0 11.0 0.83 316 55 0.72 11
10 250 286 2.5 10.0 0.83 286 55 0.76 12
11 250 273 10.0 10.0 0.81 600 70 0.85 13
12 250 273 9.0 9.0 0.83 600 80 0.86 14
13 261 273 2.5 15.0 0.83 286 40 0.87 15
14 250 546 13.0 20.0 0.82 334 100 1.00 16
Table 10: Pareto-optimal reprogramming attacks for condi-
tion 7. Units are as in Table 4.
Condition 8
# VFth VTth VFdur VTdur NSRcorth AFibth stb Eff. Dist.
1 308 522 2.0 2.0 0.89 273 6 0.01 7
2 353 546 1.0 1.0 0.86 273 6 0.03 8
3 308 572 1.0 1.0 0.85 273 6 0.05 9
4 293 600 1.0 1.0 0.96 600 8 0.14 10
5 414 632 1.0 1.0 0.92 223 55 0.31 11
6 343 667 1.0 1.0 0.96 273 6 0.48 12
Table 11: Pareto-optimal reprogramming attacks for condi-
tion 8. Units are as in Table 4.
Condition 10
# VFth VTth VFdur VTdur NSRcorth AFibth stb Eff. Dist.
1 300 375 2.0 3.5 0.92 316 22 0.01 2
2 273 364 2.0 4.0 0.91 300 14 0.08 3
3 273 353 3.0 4.5 0.91 375 28 0.16 4
4 261 343 3.0 5.0 0.89 286 22 0.24 5
5 261 334 3.5 6.0 0.88 286 32 0.37 6
6 250 325 4.0 7.0 0.87 600 35 0.62 7
7 273 316 4.5 8.0 0.86 375 6 0.84 8
8 273 308 6.0 9.0 0.85 231 45 0.94 9
9 250 300 4.5 10.0 0.90 546 6 0.96 10
10 286 293 8.0 11.0 0.90 215 8 0.99 11
11 240 293 10.0 13.0 0.86 600 35 1.00 13
Table 12: Pareto-optimal reprogramming attacks for condi-
tion 10. Units are as in Table 4.
Condition 11
# VFth VTth VFdur VTdur NSRcorth AFibth stb Eff. Dist.
1 400 600 1.0 1.0 0.85 223 18 0.01 10
2 375 632 1.0 1.5 0.96 215 6 0.03 11
3 375 667 1.0 1.0 0.96 215 6 0.06 12
Table 13: Pareto-optimal reprogramming attacks for condi-
tion 11. Units are as in Table 4.
Condition 12
# VFth VTth VFdur VTdur NSRcorth AFibth stb Eff. Dist.
1 325 375 1.0 1.0 0.96 353 18 0.01 3
2 353 375 1.0 1.0 0.96 286 10 0.02 6
3 364 388 1.0 1.0 0.96 429 8 0.09 7
4 375 388 1.0 6.0 0.95 429 8 0.20 8
5 388 400 1.0 1.0 0.96 231 45 0.29 9
6 400 414 1.0 1.5 0.96 231 50 0.33 10
7 429 667 1.0 7.0 0.82 231 10 0.35 12
8 445 546 1.0 13.0 0.81 231 10 0.36 13
9 462 667 1.0 2.5 0.96 231 10 0.38 14
10 480 667 1.0 2.5 0.96 231 10 0.41 15
11 500 667 1.0 2.5 0.96 231 10 0.47 16
12 522 667 1.0 1.0 0.92 231 10 0.58 17
13 546 600 1.0 2.5 0.96 231 10 0.75 18
Table 14: Pareto-optimal reprogramming attacks for condi-
tion 12. Units are as in Table 4.
Condition 13
# VFth VTth VFdur VTdur NSRcorth AFibth stb Eff. Dist.
1 462 546 1.0 14.0 0.96 600 32 0.01 14
2 480 500 1.0 14.0 0.96 600 32 0.02 15
3 500 522 1.0 14.0 0.96 600 32 0.06 16
4 522 546 1.0 14.0 0.96 600 32 0.13 17
5 546 572 1.0 3.5 0.96 429 120 0.20 18
Table 15: Pareto-optimal reprogramming attacks for condi-
tion 13. Units are as in Table 4.
Condition 14
# VFth VTth VFdur VTdur NSRcorth AFibth stb Eff. Dist.
1 325 667 1.0 1.5 0.96 261 28 0.01 12
2 462 667 1.0 1.5 0.80 600 24 0.02 14
3 480 667 1.0 2.0 0.96 261 28 0.03 15
4 500 667 1.0 1.5 0.96 261 28 0.06 16
5 522 667 1.0 1.5 0.96 261 28 0.12 17
6 546 667 1.0 2.0 0.96 261 28 0.16 18
Table 16: Pareto-optimal reprogramming attacks for condi-
tion 14. Units are as in Table 4.
Condition 15
# VFth VTth VFdur VTdur NSRcorth AFibth stb Eff. Dist.
1 414 445 1.0 2.5 0.96 500 18 0.01 11
2 429 445 1.0 2.5 0.96 500 18 0.09 12
3 445 462 1.0 4.0 0.96 500 18 0.33 13
4 462 667 1.0 14.0 0.81 375 8 0.75 14
5 480 572 1.0 15.0 0.96 375 90 0.89 15
6 500 572 1.5 20.0 0.96 375 80 0.92 16
Table 17: Pareto-optimal reprogramming attacks for condi-
tion 15. Units are as in Table 4.
Condition 16
# VFth VTth VFdur VTdur NSRcorth AFibth stb Eff. Dist.
1 308 388 1.0 3.0 0.95 375 18 0.02 1
2 293 375 2.0 3.5 0.92 316 16 0.07 2
3 273 364 2.5 4.0 0.91 300 16 0.11 3
4 261 353 3.0 4.5 0.90 286 28 0.19 4
5 250 353 1.5 5.0 0.91 300 30 0.20 5
6 240 334 4.0 6.0 0.90 546 14 0.34 6
7 273 325 4.0 7.0 0.90 286 18 0.58 7
8 240 316 1.5 8.0 0.90 546 14 0.77 8
9 261 308 4.0 9.0 0.85 400 32 0.91 9
10 286 300 7.0 10.0 0.91 375 18 0.97 10
11 286 293 7.0 11.0 0.91 375 18 0.99 11
Table 18: Pareto-optimal reprogramming attacks for condi-
tion 16. Units are as in Table 4.
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Condition 17
# VFth VTth VFdur VTdur NSRcorth AFibth stb Eff. Dist.
1 240 334 2.5 6.0 0.88 316 32 0.05 6
2 300 325 4.0 7.0 0.87 353 35 0.12 7
3 308 316 2.0 8.0 0.86 546 40 0.25 8
4 300 308 2.5 9.0 0.85 546 45 0.36 9
5 250 300 1.0 7.0 0.84 546 50 0.44 10
6 273 293 4.0 11.0 0.83 600 45 0.52 11
7 261 286 1.5 12.0 0.82 600 50 0.61 12
8 250 273 1.0 13.0 0.86 546 40 0.77 13
9 250 273 9.0 14.0 0.89 600 60 0.78 14
10 250 400 5.0 20.0 0.78 207 60 1.00 16
Table 19: Pareto-optimal reprogramming attacks for condi-
tion 17. Units are as in Table 4.
Condition 18
# VFth VTth VFdur VTdur NSRcorth AFibth stb Eff. Dist.
1 300 334 4.0 6.0 0.88 546 32 0.04 6
2 316 325 4.0 7.0 0.87 600 35 0.16 7
3 300 316 1.0 8.0 0.86 462 40 0.28 8
4 300 308 3.0 9.0 0.86 462 45 0.34 9
5 293 300 4.0 10.0 0.86 462 50 0.48 10
6 261 293 5.0 9.0 0.86 429 50 0.57 11
7 273 286 1.0 12.0 0.84 429 12 0.67 12
8 240 273 9.0 13.0 0.85 500 50 0.81 13
9 240 273 9.0 15.0 0.85 500 50 0.82 15
10 250 546 1.0 20.0 0.78 429 100 1.00 16
Table 20: Pareto-optimal reprogramming attacks for condi-
tion 18. Units are as in Table 4.
Condition 19
# VFth VTth VFdur VTdur NSRcorth AFibth stb Eff. Dist.
1 250 334 1.5 6.0 0.88 546 32 0.04 6
2 316 325 1.0 7.0 0.87 500 35 0.16 7
3 261 316 1.5 8.0 0.86 316 40 0.29 8
4 273 308 4.0 8.0 0.85 300 45 0.35 9
5 273 300 7.0 10.0 0.84 429 50 0.47 10
6 261 293 7.0 10.0 0.83 250 45 0.52 11
7 273 286 2.0 11.0 0.82 286 60 0.58 12
8 250 273 6.0 13.0 0.81 316 50 0.82 13
9 261 273 2.5 14.0 0.80 286 80 0.83 14
10 250 286 8.0 20.0 0.78 546 100 1.00 16
Table 21: Pareto-optimal reprogramming attacks for condi-
tion 19. Units are as in Table 4.
SVT conditions
# VFth VTth VFdur VTdur NSRcorth AFibth stb Eff. Dist.
1 316 429 1.5 1.5 0.96 400 24 0.005 2
2 273 445 1.5 1.5 0.96 353 22 0.010 3
3 334 462 1.0 1.0 0.96 353 22 0.015 4
4 343 480 1.0 1.0 0.96 400 30 0.035 5
5 353 500 1.0 1.0 0.96 353 32 0.045 6
6 364 500 1.0 1.0 0.96 353 24 0.060 7
7 375 546 1.0 1.5 0.96 400 30 0.085 8
8 388 572 1.0 1.0 0.85 353 24 0.090 9
9 400 600 1.0 1.0 0.85 353 24 0.095 10
10 388 632 1.0 1.0 0.96 353 24 0.115 11
11 429 667 1.0 1.0 0.82 353 24 0.135 12
12 445 667 1.0 1.0 0.81 353 24 0.200 13
13 462 667 1.0 1.0 0.80 353 24 0.230 14
14 480 667 1.0 1.0 0.81 353 24 0.285 15
15 500 667 1.0 1.0 0.80 353 24 0.320 16
16 522 667 1.0 1.0 0.96 353 24 0.380 17
17 546 667 1.0 1.0 0.80 353 24 0.490 18
Table 22: Pareto-optimal reprogramming attacks for the
group of SVT conditions. Units are as in Table 4.
VT conditions
# VFth VTth VFdur VTdur NSRcorth AFibth stb Eff. Dist.
1 300 388 1.5 3.0 0.95 334 18 0.005 1
2 293 375 2.0 3.0 0.92 334 24 0.010 2
3 273 364 2.5 4.0 0.93 300 26 0.040 3
4 261 353 3.0 4.5 0.96 375 28 0.060 4
5 250 343 2.0 5.0 0.92 316 30 0.095 5
6 273 334 4.0 6.0 0.88 316 32 0.195 6
7 250 325 3.5 7.0 0.87 600 35 0.340 7
8 250 316 3.0 8.0 0.96 300 40 0.515 8
9 261 308 3.0 9.0 0.96 286 45 0.640 9
10 261 300 7.0 10.0 0.87 375 50 0.745 10
11 261 293 7.0 11.0 0.87 286 55 0.795 11
12 250 286 3.0 12.0 0.86 546 55 0.865 12
13 250 273 7.0 12.0 0.86 546 45 0.940 13
14 250 293 3.0 20.0 0.78 429 100 1.000 16
Table 23: Pareto-optimal reprogramming attacks for the
group of VT conditions. Units are as in Table 4.
Training EGMs Test EGMs
Cond. OMT RS OMT RS
1 6.935 6.775 6.3 6.260
2 7.680 7.260 6.520 6.520
3 17.455 17.325 17.41 17.16
4 15.21 13.595 15.23 14.28
5 14.68 14.135 13.58 13.26
6 8.060 7.675 8.790 8.770
7 14.61 14.30 13.72 13.54
8 6.570 6.045 4.860 4.910
10 17.71 17.605 17.14 16.67
11 0.8350 0.7450 0.25 0.25
12 8.745 7.580 9.010 8.930
13 1.585 1.575 1.010 1.010
14 1.350 1.240 1.440 1.460
15 9.940 9.9 10.34 10.34
16 17.525 17.305 16.58 16.24
17 13.415 13.385 13.32 13.24
18 13.585 13.585 13.07 13.24
19 13.575 13.575 13.40 13.37
Table 24: Area under the curve (AUC) of Pareto fronts
synthesized by OMT and random search (RS) evaluated on
training and test data. The best value between OMT and RS
is highlighted in bold.
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Figure 10: Area under the curve (AUC) of Pareto fronts
synthesized by OMT with different sizes of the training set,
and evaluated on test signals. Each line represents the AUCs
of a specific condition. Reported AUC values are relative to
the AUC obtained with 100 training signals.
